Droop quota

In the study of electoral systems, the Droop quota (sometimes called the Hagenbach-Bischoff, Britton, or Newland-Britton quota[1][a]) is the minimum number of votes a party or candidate needs to receive in a district to guarantee they will win at least one seat.[3][4]

The Droop quota is used to extend the concept of a majority to multiwinner elections, taking the place of the 50% bar in single-winner elections. Just as any candidate with more than half of all votes is guaranteed to be declared the winner in single-seat election, any candidate with more than a Droop quota's worth of votes is guaranteed to win a seat in a multiwinner election.[4]

Besides establishing winners, the Droop quota is used to define the number of excess votes, i.e. votes not needed by a candidate who has been declared elected. In proportional quota-based systems such as STV or expanding approvals, these excess votes can be transferred to other candidates to prevent them from being wasted.[4]

The Droop quota was first suggested by the English lawyer and mathematician Henry Richmond Droop (1831–1884) as an alternative to the Hare quota,[4] and later by Swiss physicist Eduard Hagenbach-Bischof in the context of STV and not for the largest remainder method.[4][5]

The Droop quota is used in almost all STV elections, including those in Australia,[6] the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Malta.[7] It is also used in South Africa to allocate seats by the largest remainder method.[8][9] Switzerland uses the Droop quota, calling it the Hagenbach-Bischof quota.

Although common, the quota's use in proportional representation has been criticized both for its bias toward large parties[10] and for its ability to create no-show paradoxes, situations where a candidate or party loses a seat as a result of having won too many votes. However, this situation can occur regardless of whether the quota is used with largest remainders[11] or STV.[12] Charges of no-show paradoxes are based on having knowledge of how a vote would be transferred if a candidate were eliminated when that candidate may not have been in real life. It is clear that any system that uses ranked votes produces different results if candidates are in different order, which is partly determined by how votes are split and therefore that charge can apply to any ranked voting system no matter what quota is used. Some analysis states that no-show paradoxes are extremely rare in real-world elections.[13] For one thing, transfers have little effect in general on who is elected, the winners usually being among the front runners in the first round of counting anyway.[14]

Definition

The value of the exact Droop quota for a -winner election is given by the expression:[1][15][16][17][18][19][20]

In the case of a single-winner election, this reduces to the familiar simple majority rule. Under such a rule, a candidate can be declared elected as soon as they have more than 50% of the vote, i.e. their vote total exceeds .[1] A candidate who, at any point, holds strictly more than one Droop quota's worth of votes is therefore guaranteed to win a seat.[21][b]

Sometimes, the Droop quota is written as a share of all votes, in which case it has value 1k+1.

Original Droop quota

The original Droop as devised by Henry Droop was one more than the exact Droop:

Modern variants of STV use fractional transfers of ballots to eliminate uncertainty and therefore do not need to use the original whole-vote Droop quota. The original Droop quota is not necessary in elections that allow fractional transfers of ballots.

However, some older implementations of STV with whole vote reassignment cannot handle fractional quotas and so instead will either round up or add one and truncate:[4]

This variant of the quota is generally not recommended in the context of modern elections with fractional votes, where it can cause problems in small elections (see § Common errors).[1][22] However, it is the most commonly used definition in legislative codes worldwide.

Derivation

The Droop quota can be derived by considering what would happen if k candidates (here called "Droop winners") have exceeded the Droop quota. The goal is to identify whether an outside candidate could defeat any of these candidates. In this situation, if each quota winner's share of the vote equals 1k+1, while all unelected candidates' share of the vote, taken together, is at most 1k+1 votes. Thus, even if there were only one unelected candidate who held all the remaining votes, their vote tally would not exceed any of those with Droop quota.[4]

Example in STV

The following election has 3 seats to be filled by single transferable vote. There are 4 candidates: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and Aaron Burr. There are 102 voters, but two of the votes are spoiled.

The total number of valid votes is 100, and there are 3 seats. The Droop quota is therefore .[18] These votes are as follows:

45 voters 20 voters 25 voters 10 voters
1 Washington Burr Jefferson Hamilton
2 Hamilton Jefferson Burr Washington
3 Jefferson Washington Washington Jefferson

First preferences for each candidate are tallied:

  • Washington: 45 checkY
  • Hamilton: 10
  • Burr: 20
  • Jefferson: 25

Only Washington has strictly more than 25 votes. As a result, he is immediately elected. Washington has 20 excess votes that can be transferred to their second choice, Hamilton. The tallies therefore become:

  • Washington: 25 checkY
  • Hamilton: 30checkY
  • Burr: 20
  • Jefferson: 25

Hamilton is elected, so his excess votes are redistributed. Thanks to Hamilton's support, Jefferson receives 30 votes to Burr's 20 and is elected.

If all of Hamilton's supporters had instead backed Burr, the election for the last seat would have been tied, requiring a tiebreaker; generally, ties are broken by taking the limit of the results as the quota approaches the exact Droop quota.

Common errors

The term Droop quota is frequently defined or understood in a variety of ways that can cause confusion as to what value legislators and political observers are referring.[23] At least six different versions appear in various legal codes or definitions of the quota, all varying by one vote.[23] The Electoral Reform Society handbook on STV has advised against such variants since at least 1976, as they can cause problems with proportionality in small elections.[1][22] In addition, it means that vote totals cannot be summarized into percentages because the winning candidate may depend on the choice of unit or total number of ballots (not just their distribution across candidates).[1][22] Common variants of the Droop quota include:

The variants in the first line come from Droop's discussion in the context of Hare's STV proposal. Hare assumed that to calculate election results, physical ballots would be reshuffled across piles and did not consider the possibility of fractional votes. In such a situation, rounding the number of votes up (or, alternatively, adding one and rounding down)[c] introduces as little error as possible, while maintaining the admissibility of the quota.[23][4]

Some believe the original form of the Droop quota is still needed in modern STV systems to prevent an extra candidate reaching quota than there are winners.[23] As Newland and Britton noted in 1974, this is not a problem: if the last two winners both receive a Droop quota of votes, rules can be applied to break the tie, and ties can occur regardless of which quota is used.[1][22] Due to perceived need for this extra safety measure, Ireland, Malta and Australia have used Droop's original quota, , for the last hundred years.[1][22]

Comparison with Hare

The Droop quota is sometimes confused with the more intuitive Hare quota. While the Droop quota gives the number of votes needed to mathematically guarantee a candidate's election, the Hare quota gives the number of voters represented by each winner in an exactly proportional system (i.e. one where each vote is represented equally and every vote is used). Unfortunately, frequently one or more votes are found to be exhausted and there is no way for the last elected candidate to be elected with Hare.

The Hare quota gives more proportional outcomes on average because it is statistically unbiased.[10] By contrast, the Droop quota is more biased towards large parties than any other admissible quota.[10] As a result, the Droop quota is the quota most likely to produce minority rule by a plurality party, where a party representing less than half of the voters may take majority of seats in a constituency.[10] However, the Droop quota has the advantage that any party receiving more than half the votes will receive at least half of all seats.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Some authors use the terms "Newland-Britton quota" or "exact Droop quota" to refer to the quantity described in this article, and reserve the term "Droop quota" for the archaic or rounded form of the Droop quota (the original found in the works of Henry Droop).[2]
  2. ^ By abuse of notation, mathematicians may write the quota as votesk+1 + 𝜖, where is taken arbitrarily close to 0 (i.e. as a limit), which allows breaking some ties for the last seat.
  3. ^ The two are only different when the number of votes is exactly a whole number.

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h Lundell, Jonathan; Hill, ID (October 2007). "Notes on the Droop quota" (PDF). Voting Matters (24): 3–6.
  2. ^ Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017). "Quota Methods of Apportionment: Divide and Rank". Proportional Representation. pp. 95–105. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_5. ISBN 978-3-319-64706-7.
  3. ^ "Droop Quota", The Encyclopedia of Political Science, 2300 N Street, NW, Suite 800, Washington DC 20037 United States: CQ Press, 2011, doi:10.4135/9781608712434.n455, ISBN 978-1-933116-44-0, retrieved 2024-05-03{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h Droop, Henry Richmond (1881). "On methods of electing representatives" (PDF). Journal of the Statistical Society of London. 44 (2): 141–196 [Discussion, 197–202] [33 (176)]. doi:10.2307/2339223. JSTOR 2339223. Reprinted in Voting matters Issue 24 (October 2007) pp. 7–46.
  5. ^ Dancisin, Vladimir. "MISINTERPRETATION OF THE HAGENBACH-BISCHOFF QUOTA". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  6. ^ "Proportional Representation Voting Systems of Australia's Parliaments". Electoral Council of Australia & New Zealand. Archived from the original on 6 July 2024.
  7. ^ "Electoral Commission of Malta". electoral.gov.mt. Retrieved 2025-01-20.
  8. ^ Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2014). Proportional representation : apportionment methods and their applications. Internet Archive. Cham ; New York : Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-03855-1.
  9. ^ "IFES Election Guide | Elections: South African National Assembly 2014 General". www.electionguide.org. Retrieved 2024-06-02.
  10. ^ a b c d Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.), "Favoring Some at the Expense of Others: Seat Biases", Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 127–147, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_7, ISBN 978-3-319-64707-4, retrieved 2024-05-10{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link)
  11. ^ Dančišin, Vladimír (2017-01-01). "No-show paradox in Slovak party-list proportional system". Human Affairs. 27 (1): 15–21. doi:10.1515/humaff-2017-0002. ISSN 1337-401X.
  12. ^ Ray, Dipankar (1983-07-01). "Hare's voting scheme and negative responsiveness". Mathematical Social Sciences. 4 (3): 301–303. doi:10.1016/0165-4896(83)90032-X. ISSN 0165-4896.
  13. ^ Mohsin et al, Computational Complexity of Verifying the Group No-show Paradox. https://www.ijcai.org/proceedings/2024/0328.pdf accessed 20210-16
  14. ^ Stephen Quinlan, "The transfers game A comparative analysis of the mechanical effect of lower preference votes in STV systems" https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0192512120907925. accessed 2025-10-16
  15. ^ Delemazure, Théo; Peters, Dominik (2024-12-17). "Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences". Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC '24. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. Footnote 12. arXiv:2404.11407. doi:10.1145/3670865.3673501. ISBN 979-8-4007-0704-9.
  16. ^ Woodall, Douglass. "Properties of Preferential Election Rules". Voting Matters (3).
  17. ^ Lee, Kap-Yun (1999). "The Votes Mattered: Decreasing Party Support under the Two-Member-District SNTV in Korea (1973–1978)". In Grofman, Bernard; Lee, Sung-Chull; Winckler, Edwin; Woodall, Brian (eds.). Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 9780472109098.
  18. ^ a b Gallagher, Michael (October 1992). "Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities". British Journal of Political Science. 22 (4): 469–496. doi:10.1017/s0007123400006499.
  19. ^ Giannetti, Daniela; Grofman, Bernard (1 February 2011). "Appendix E: Glossary of Electoral System Terms". A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform: Evaluating the Long Run Consequences of 1990s Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan (PDF). Springer Science & Business Media. p. 134. ISBN 978-1-4419-7228-6. Droop quota of votes (for list PR systems, q.v., or single transferable vote, q.v.). This is equal to , where is the size of the actual electorate and is the number of seats to be filled.
  20. ^ Graham-Squire, Adam; Jones, Matthew I.; McCune, David (2024-08-07), New fairness criteria for truncated ballots in multi-winner ranked-choice elections, arXiv:2408.03926
  21. ^ Grofman, Bernard (23 November 1999). "SNTV, STV, and Single-Member-District Systems: Theoretical Comparisons and Contrasts". Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 978-0-472-10909-8.
  22. ^ a b c d e Newland, Robert A. (June 1980). "Droop quota and D'Hondt rule". Representation. 20 (80): 21–22. doi:10.1080/00344898008459290. ISSN 0034-4893.
  23. ^ a b c d Dančišin, Vladimír (2013). "Misinterpretation of the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota". Annales Scientia Politica. 2 (1): 76.

Sources

  • Robert, Henry M.; et al. (2011). Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised (11th ed.). Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Da Capo Press. p. 4. ISBN 978-0-306-82020-5.

Further reading

  • Droop, Henry Richmond (1869). On the Political and Social Effects of Different Methods of Electing Representatives. London.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)