Friedrich Waismann

Friedrich Waismann
Born(1896-03-21)March 21, 1896
Vienna, Austria-Hungary
DiedNovember 4, 1959(1959-11-04) (aged 63)
Oxford, England
EducationUniversity of Vienna
Known forOpen texture
Scientific career
FieldsMathematics, physics, philosophy
InstitutionsUniversity of Vienna
University of Cambridge
University of Oxford
Doctoral advisorMoritz Schlick
de:Robert Reininger

Friedrich Waismann (/ˈvaɪsmɑːn/;[1] German: [ˈvaɪsman]; 21 March 1896 – 4 November 1959) was an Austrian mathematician, physicist, and philosopher. He is best known for being a member of the Vienna Circle and one of the key theorists in logical positivism.

Biography

Born to a Jewish family in Vienna, Austria-Hungary, Waismann was educated at the University of Vienna.[2] From 1917 to 1922 he studied philosophy, physics and mathematics there taught by, among others, the mathematician Hans Hahn and the philosopher Alois Höfler.[3] In 1922, he came under the tutelage of Moritz Schlick, the founder of the Vienna Circle, to whom he had intended to submit a doctoral thesis. Waismann repeatedly changed dissertation topic however and only obtained his doctoral degree some months after Schick's murder in 1936, under the 'expedient' direction of Robert Reininger (1869 – 1955).[4][3] He obtained a temporary position at Cambridge in the autumn of 1937, the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany in 1938 made him a refugee.[5] He was a reader in philosophy of science at the University of Cambridge from 1937 to 1939, and lecturer in philosophy of mathematics at the University of Oxford from 1939 until his death.

Waismann lost his wife Hermine née Antscherl, and his only child Thomas to suicide (in, respectively, 1942 and 1952).[4] He died in Oxford in 1959.

Relationship with Wittgenstein

After considerable correspondence, Schlick first met Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1927. The two met several times before the Wittgenstein would agree to be introduced to some of Schlick's circle. From 1927 to 1928 Wittgenstein met with a circle including Schlick, almost always Waismann, sometimes Rudolf Carnap, and sometimes Herbert Feigl and his future wife Maria Kesper. But it is doubtful that Wittgenstein ever attended any meetings of the Vienna Circle proper. From 1929, Wittgenstein's contact with the Circle was restricted to meetings with Schlick and Waismann alone.[6]

These later meetings (December 1929 up to March 1932) were recorded by Waismann, and eventually published in English translation in Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979). By the time these conversations began, Schlick had tasked Waismann with writing an exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophy.[7] This project would undergo radical transformation but the final text, inspired by Wittgenstein but very much Waismann's own work, was published posthumously in English as The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy in 1965.[8] Further material and notes from the period were published in English under the editorship of Gordon Baker in 2003.[9]

Waismann later accused Wittgenstein of obscurantism because of what he considered to be his betrayal of the project of logical positivism and empirically-based explanation.[10]

Philosophy

Linguistic philosophy and logical positivism

In Introduction to Mathematical Thinking: The Formation of Concepts in Modern Mathematics (1936), Waismann argued that mathematical truths are true by convention rather than being necessarily (or verifiably) true. His collected papers were published posthumously in How I See Philosophy (1968, ed. R. Harré)[11] and Philosophical Papers (1976, ed. B. F. McGuinness).[12][13]

Porosity and verifiability

Waismann introduced the concept of open texture. He had coined the phrase "die Porosität der Begriffe" ("the porosity of concepts") for this purpose and credits William Kneale for suggesting the English term he then adopted.[14] The idea, according to Anthony Quinton, is that the rules governing the use of the expressions of ordinary discourse cover only broadly familiar contingencies and not more surprising possibilities:

Waismann's point is not so much that words of common speech are vague, that there are borderline cases in which we cannot decide whether to apply them or not ... it is rather that the operative criteria for their application are in practice only satisfied when certain other conditions ... are satisfied as well. What we should say in a conceivable case where the criteria are satisfied but the ordinarily accompanying conditions are not is thus indeterminate. [15]

Simon Blackburn (1996) offers an example:

the term “mother” is not vague, but its open texture is revealed if ... differences open up between the mother that produces the ovum, the mother that carries the foetus to term, and the mother that rears the baby. It will then be fruitless to pursue the question of which is the ‘real’ mother, since the term is not adapted to giving a decision in the new circumstance.[16]

It is probably based, Brian Bix suggests, "on a constructivist view of language Wittgenstein put forward in the early 1930s."[17] According to Waismann, even after measures have been taken to ensure that a statement is precise, there remains an inexhaustible source of vagueness due to an indefinite number of possibilities.[18] Waismann's notion of vagueness is slightly different from his concept of open texture―he explained that open texture is more like the possibility of vagueness;[19] vagueness can also be remedied so that it can be made more precise, while open texture cannot.[19]

Open texture has been found in legal philosophy through the writings of H. L. A. Hart (see Hart's "Formalism and Rule Scepticism" in The Concept of Law). According to Hart, vagueness constitutes a fundamental feature of legal languages.[20] It is claimed, however, that Waismann's conceptualization has limited practical application, since it is more for the extraordinary, while Hart's view of open texture concerns the more mundane, approaching the term in the context of a particular norm.[21]

Selected bibliography

Articles

References

  1. ^ Sources on Wittgenstein: the Nachlasses of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap and Friedrich Waismann on YouTube
  2. ^ Quinton, Anthony (1977). "Introduction". In McGuiness, Brian (ed.). Friedrich Waismann: Philosophical Papers. D. Reidel Publishing Company. p. ix. ISBN 9789027707130.
  3. ^ a b Limbeck-Lilienau, Christoph (2019), Makovec, Dejan; Shapiro, Stewart (eds.), "Waismann in the Vienna Circle", Friedrich Waismann, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2 Waismann and the Beginning of the Circle, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25008-9_2, ISBN 978-3-030-25007-2, retrieved 25 April 2026{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link) Pre-print at Academia.edu; [1]
  4. ^ a b Lavers, Gregory (2019), Makovec, Dejan; Shapiro, Stewart (eds.), "Waismann: From Wittgenstein's Tafelrunde to His Writings on Analyticity", Friedrich Waismann, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2 Timeline and Waismann Later Works, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25008-9_7, ISBN 978-3-030-25007-2, retrieved 26 April 2026{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link) Pre-print at Academia.edu; [1]
  5. ^ McGuinness, Brian (2011), McGuinness, B.F. (ed.), "Waismann: The Wandering Scholar", Friedrich Waismann - Causality and Logical Positivism, vol. 15, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, p. 12, doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1751-0_1 ISBN 978-94-007-1750-3
  6. ^ McGuinness, Brian (1979). "Preface". In McGuinness, Brian (ed.). Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann. translation by Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness. New York: Barnes & Noble Books. pp. 14–18. ISBN 978-0-06-497310-6.
  7. ^ Hacker, P. M. S. (1981). "Review of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann, Brian McGuinness; Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1930-1932, From the Notes of John King Desmond Lee; Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge 1932-1935, from the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald". The Philosophical Review. 90 (3): 445–446. doi:10.2307/2184987. ISSN 0031-8108. JSTOR 2184987.
  8. ^ Waismann, Friedrich (1965). The principles of linguistic philosophy. London : Macmillan ; New York : St. Martin's Press.
  9. ^ McGinn, Marie (6 June 2004). "The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle: Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Archived from the original on 31 May 2023. Retrieved 16 February 2025.
  10. ^ Shanker, S., & Shanker, V. A. (1986), Ludwig Wittgenstein: critical assessments. London: Croom Helm,50-51.
  11. ^ Church, Alonzo (1973). "Review of How I see Philosophy". The Journal of Symbolic Logic. 38 (4): 663–665. doi:10.2307/2272024. ISSN 0022-4812. JSTOR 2272024. This book collects in a single volume the important philosophical papers of Waismann. The editor explains on page viii that Waismann's The relevance of psychology to logic (Aristotelian Society supplementary volume XVII, 1938, pp. 34-67) has been omitted as not forming a natural part of Waismann's later philosophy. It should be added that papers which were written by Waismann in German have also been omitted.
  12. ^ Stock, Guy (1979). "Review of Philosophical Papers". The Philosophical Quarterly. 29 (114): 78–81. doi:10.2307/2219187. ISSN 0031-8094. JSTOR 2219187. This collection of fourteen papers spans the years 1928 to the 1950s. ... The earlier papers are mainly translations appearing in English for the first time. The later ones were written in English and are previously unpublished.
  13. ^ a b Waismann, Friedrich (1977). McGuinness, Brian (ed.). Philosophical papers. Vienna Circle collection. Dordrecht: Reidel. ISBN 978-90-277-0713-0.
  14. ^ MacKinnon, D. M.; Waismann, F.; Kneale, W. C. (1945). "Symposium: Verifiability". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. 19: 121. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/19.1.101. JSTOR 4106531.
  15. ^ Quinton 1977, p. xiii.
  16. ^ Blackburn, Simon (1996). The Oxford dictionary of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Open texture. ISBN 978-0-19-283134-7. quoted in: Shapiro, Stewart; Roberts, Craige (2019), Makovec, Dejan; Shapiro, Stewart (eds.), "Open Texture and Analyticity" (PDF), Friedrich Waismann, Cham: Springer International Publishing, p. 191, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25008-9_9, ISBN 978-3-030-25007-2, retrieved 29 April 2026{{citation}}: CS1 maint: work parameter with ISBN (link) [author eprint]
  17. ^ Bix, Brian (2 November 1995). "H. L. A. Hart and the 'Open Texture' of Language". Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy. Oxford University Press. pp. 7–35. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198260509.003.0002. ISBN 978-0-19-826050-9.
  18. ^ Audi, Robert (1999). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, Robert Audi, 1999: The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 632. ISBN 9780521637220.
  19. ^ a b Freeman, Michael; Smith, Fiona (2013). Law and Language: Current Legal Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 132. ISBN 9780199673667.
  20. ^ Urbina, Sebastián (31 August 2002). Legal Method and the Rule of Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. p. 81. ISBN 9041118705.
  21. ^ Beltrán, Jordi Ferrer; Ratti, Giovanni Battista (2012). The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 196. ISBN 9780199661640.

Further reading

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