Istiqlal Party
Istiqlal Party حزب الإستقلال ⴰⴽⴰⴱⴰⵔ ⵏ ⵍⵉⵙⵜⵉⵇⵍⴰⵍ Parti Istiqlal | |
|---|---|
![]() | |
| General Secretary | Nizar Baraka |
| Founder | Ahmed Balafrej |
| Founded | January 1944 |
| Preceded by |
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| Headquarters | 4, rue Ibn Toumert, Rabat |
| Newspaper | Al-Alam (Arab) L'Opinion (French) |
| Ideology |
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| Political position | Centre-right |
| Regional affiliation | Democrat Union of Africa |
| European affiliation | EPP (regional partner)[3] ACRE (2014–2018) |
| International affiliation | International Democracy Union[3][8] Centrist Democrat International[3] |
| House of Representatives | 81 / 395 (21%) |
| House of Councillors | 24 / 120 (20%) |
| Website | |
| www | |
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The Istiqlal Party[a] is a political party in Morocco. It is a conservative and monarchist party and a member of the Centrist Democrat International and International Democracy Union. Istiqlal headed a coalition government under Abbas El Fassi from 19 September 2007 to 29 November 2011. From 2013 to 2021, it was part of the opposition. Since 2021 it is part of a coalition government led by Aziz Akhannouch.
The party emerged in January 1944 during the anti-colonial struggle against French and Spanish imperial rule,[9][10] making it the oldest active political party in Morocco.[11]
History
Background
The 1930 Berber Dahir which established separate judicial systems for Arabs and Berbers in Morocco functioned as a catalyst for the formation of the Moroccan nationalist movement.[12][13][14] In response to the Dahir, nationalists like Ahmed Balafrej and Allal al-Fassi began to coordinate.[15] In August 1930, activists from Salé, Rabat, Tetouan and Fes formed the Zawiya a steering committee composed of the most important nationalist leaders. There was also a larger group called the Taifa or the "Outer Circle".[16][17] Another organisation that formed from the protest movement against the Dahir was the Moroccan Action Committee[15] (French: Comité d'Action Marocaine; CAM)[18] also known as the National Action Bloc (Arabic: كتلة العمل الوطني, romanized: Kutlat al-ʿAmal al-Waṭanī; or the Kutla).[19] The Kutla reached 6500 members before it disbanded in 1937.[20] Its president was Allal al-Fassi and its secretary was Mohammed Hassan Ouazzani.[21] The Kutla published the Plan of Reforms (French: Plan de Réformes marocaines) in 1934 in both Arabic and French[22] which only sought reform and the restoring of confidence in the aims of the 1912 Treaty of Fes rather than outright independence.[23][24][25] After the nationalist movement began to split in 1937,[26] the Kutla was succeeded by the National Party (Ḥizb al-Waṭanī) which al-Fassi co-led.[27]
Foundation

The Istiqlal Party was founded by former members of the Moroccan Action Committee in January 1944[9] or 1943.[28] The party chose Ahmed Balafrej as its head and Allal al-Fassi in the "purely honorary" role of zaʿīm of the Istiqlal.[29] On January 11, 1944, they published their Independence Manifesto which called for "the independence of Morocco in its national entirety under the aegis of His Majesty Sidi Muhammad Bin Yusuf" and a democratic constitutional government that guaranteed the rights of "all elements in society".[30] The manifesto also made other demands: Muhammad V negotiating independence, Morocco signing the Atlantic Charter and taking part in the peace conference.[31][32] It had 56,[33] 58[34] or 59 signatories[35] including figures like Ahmed Belafrej, Mehdi Ben Barka and Abderrahmane Youssoufi.[33][34] The only female signatory was Malika al-Fassi.[36]

The Istiqlal held Arab nationalist views and sought to incorporate Berbers into a larger Moroccan national identity based in Arabism and Islam.[4] Its nationalism was bourgeois and opposed to traditional institutions.[38] The party originally represented an amalgam of a small and long-standing national conservative bourgeoise made of merchant families and religious scholars from Fes and a middle class made up of groups like teachers and doctors.[39] The Istiqlal was made up of a coalition of different political tendencies[40] According to the historian Susan Gilson Miller, the ideology of the Istiqlal at this time was a mix of ideas including "democratic constitutionalism, Egyptian reformism, Islamic teachings, nineteenth century progressivism, and Third World anticolonialism, all broadly construed."[41] Despite its myriad of influences, the Istiqlal did not appeal to all Moroccans. For example, it was seen with suspicion by Sufi orders due to the Istiqlal's Salafism and Berber tribal leaders and members due to its Pan-Arabist rhetoric.[40] The Istiqlal later expanded to include a working class population represented through the Moroccan Workers' Union (UMT).[42] It worked hard to expand its base to include groups like the urban working class but failed to find a lot of appeal in rural areas.[43] It functioned as the main political force struggling for the independence of Morocco. The initial goal stated in their manifesto was the independence from France “within the framework of a constitutional-democratic monarchy”.[44]
The establishment of the Istiqlal reflected an ideological shift in the movement from reform to independence and a transition to a mass party format that included broad parts of the Moroccan population.[45] Groups that preceded the Istiqlal like the Taifa, Zawiya and the Kutla only made efforts to reform the protectorate rather than demand full independence.[46] Protectorate officials in writings from 1944 acknowledged that "the ideas of nation and independence are henceforth commonly acknowledged". Calls for both reform and independence did persist until formal independence.[47]
The leadership of Istiqlal was successful in overcoming “petty rivalries”[48] between the different parties and anticolonial organizations and unifying the nationalist movement. This factor added to the campaign of Moroccan activists spread across the world and contributed to achieving international visibility and support for their cause.
Transnational advocacy for independence
Establishing crucial contacts for advocating the Moroccan independence abroad happened in Tangier, since it was assigned as an international zone and thus under less influence of the French or Spanish. In Tangier Moroccan Nationalists established contact with Americans residing in Morocco, which among others provided US intelligence contacts. Outside of Morocco, important developments in advocating for Moroccan independence happened in Cairo (Egypt), within the United Nations, and in Paris (France). Advocating in France was primarily focussed on communicating with French society, disseminating and exchanging information, and mobilizing students.[49]
Post-independence tensions 1956–1959
However, once the country achieved independence in 1956, the party moved into opposition against the monarchy, which had asserted itself as the country's main political actor. It had to overcome some obstacles since the party, which had just achieved their common goal, was prone to fragmentation.[50] There was a movement within the Istiqlal Party to unite Muslims and Jews called al-Wifaq (الوفاق), with prominent Jewish figures such as Armand Asoulin, David Azoulay, Marc Sabbagh, Joe Ohana, and Albert Aflalo.[51][52]

Between 1947 and 1956, the Istiqlal went through a period of significant expansion.[53] In 1944, party membership was estimated at around three thousand later expanding to ten thousand in 1947 and after 1952, one hundred thousand.[54] In the 50s, it eventually reached two hundred and fifty thousand members[55] and by the early months of Moroccan independence, it reached 1.6 million members.[56] At this time, 90% of Moroccans either were members of the Istiqlal or sympathised with it.[57] After independence, al-Fassi was appointed secretary-general and later president for life of the Istiqlal.[58]
During the period after independence, the Istiqlal sought to create a homogenous i.e. all-Istiqlal government.[59] This was explicitly stated in their 1956 National Council resolution: “a government of national union is not compatible with the delicate phase that Morocco is going through”.[60] The Istiqlal viewed themselves as the main force that led to the independence of the country.[61] Part of the reason for their mobilisation campaign for the return of the Sultan after his exile was due to their limited reach outside urban areas. They sought to use the monarch's traditional and religious forms of symbolic capital that they lacked and use the monarch to help dominate the post-independence political field and state apparatus.[62] However, the creation of a homogenous government meant a one party state where the king is reduced to just a figurehead.[63] The Istiqlal dominating the state apparatus would have increased its appeal and become seen as the main gateway for social ascension. The monarchy was weary due to a similar situation side-lining the monarchy in Tunisia. They did not wish to become secondary to the Istiqlal or become ceremonial so they came into conflict with the Istiqlal.[61]
Despite their ambitions and widespread support, they only represented a minority in the first two post-independence cabinets and the provisional National Consultative Assembly. This was due to the composition of these being determined by royal appointment.[64] Mbarek Bekkay, a former caid of Sefrou, was appointed prime minister on 8 December 1955. In the first Bekkay government, they had 50% of the government posts.[65][66] They gained another minister in the second Bekkay government.[66]
By 1956, two factions emerged within the Istiqlal: a left wing and right wing.[67] In order to maintain its wavering dominance, the early Istiqlal-dominated government engaged in political repression which led to the anti-Istiqlal Rif Revolt. After the revolt, tensions began to grow in Moroccan society with much of the Moroccan population suffering from poverty and many opposing the continued presence of American military bases. This widened the gap between the two wings within the Istiqlal Party.[68]
The right wing of the party was made up of older leaders like Allal al-Fassi, Ahmed Balafrej and Mohamed Lyazidi whilst the left wing was made up of leaders of the MLA and younger leaders associated with the Moroccan Workers' Union. It came to include Mehdi Ben Barka[67] and Abderrahim Bouabid. The split was not just a disputes between personalities but was also about ideological differences. The left wing were democratic socialists who were believers in social welfare and state control of vital sectors of the economy.[69] They opposed the presence of American military bases, advocated for the holding of popular elections and introducing limits to the power of the monarchy.[68] The right wing, who made up the majority, were economically liberal and politically conservative.[69] They supported the continued presence of American bases as the government needed economic assistance from the US. They also did not want to hold popular elections out of fear of losing their power.[68]
By spring of 1958, Mohammed V had given into most of the demands of the Istiqlal. He appointed Ahmed Balafrej prime minister and foreign minister and Abderrahim Bouabid minister of finances and economy whilst keeping palace men in other key posts. However, in the summer of that same year, the left wing broke with the conservative leadership.The left wing denounced the Balafrej government and called a wave of strikes. Bouabid later resigned after the Rif Revolt. At first, Muhammad V went to Allal al-Fassi to work out a truce among the Istiqlal's factions.[69] When al-Fassi failed, Mohammed V lent his support to the left wing by appointing Moroccan Workers' Union leader Abdallah Ibrahim as prime minister.[68] The king did this to encourage the split within the party.[70] This plan was successful as it led to al-Fassi retiring from the party and the radical Ben Barka being excluded from the government. This eventually led to the formation of a new party led by Ben Barka called the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP).[68] The split ended the chance for the Istiqlal to establish a one party system.[71]
After the split 1959–2016
Together with the leftist UNFP and later the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), the Istiqlal would form the backbone of the opposition to King Hassan II in the years to come. The Istiqlal party has taken part in many coalition governments from the late 1970s until the mid-1980s. In 1998, together with the USFP inside the Koutla and other smaller parties, the Istiqlal formed the Alternance, the first political experience in the Arab World where the opposition assumed power through the ballots.
For the party's leader Allal El Fassi, a proponent of "Greater Morocco", Morocco's independence would not be complete without the liberation of all the territories that once were part of Morocco.
In January 2006, Istiqlal criticized Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's visit to the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla on the north African coast, reflecting its nationalist heritage.
Istiqlal won 52 out of 325 seats in the parliamentary election held on 7 September 2007, more than any other party,[72] and subsequently the party's leader, Abbas El Fassi, was named Prime Minister by King Mohammed VI on 19 September 2007.[72][73]
The party won 60 out of 325 seats in the parliamentary election held in November 2011, being the second party in the parliament.[74]
Abbas El Fassi resigned as Prime Minister 29 November 2011, and resigned as Secretary-General of Istiqlal on 23 September 2012, following Justice and Development Party victory in 2011 elections.
In September 2012, Hamid Chabat was elected secretary-general of the party succeeding Abbas El Fassi.[75][76]
Development since 2016
In 2016, Istiqlal won 46 seats in parliamentary elections, a loss of 14 seats. The party joined the opposition.[77][78]
Istiqlal is a member of the Centrist Democrat International and International Democracy Union, and an associate member of the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists.
On October 7, 2017, Nizar Baraka was elected Secretary-General of the Istiqlal party, by 924 votes against 230 votes for his rival and outgoing secretary-general Hamid Chabat.[79][80] King Mohammed VI expressed his congratulations to the new Istiqlal Party leader for the confidence placed in him by the members of the party’s national council.[81]
The Istiqlal party won 81 seats in the 2021 parliamentary election, an increase of 35 seats since the last election, thus remaining the third largest party in the kingdom.[82][83]
Electoral performance
House of Representatives
| Election | Votes | % | Seats | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1963 | 1,000,506 | 30.0 | 41 / 144
|
Opposition |
| 1970 | Boycotted | 8 / 240
|
Opposition | |
| 1977 | 1,090,960 | 21.62 | 51 / 264
|
Opposition |
| 1984 | 681,083 | 15.33 | 40 / 301
|
Opposition |
| 1993 | 760,082 | 12.2 | 52 / 333
|
Opposition |
| 1997 | 840,315 | 13.8 | 32 / 325
|
Part of the government |
| 2002 | 598,226 | 9.89 | 48 / 325
|
Part of the government |
| 2007 | 494,256 | 10.7 | 52 / 325
|
Leading the government under Abbas El Fassi |
| 2011 | 562,720 | 11.9 | 60 / 395
|
Part of the government until October 2013 |
| 2016 | 620,041 | 10.68 | 46 / 395
|
Opposition |
| 2021 | 81 / 395
|
Part of the government | ||
Notes
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- Zisenwine, Daniel (2009). "'Ulama', tribalism and the national struggle in Morocco, 1944-1956". In Hatina, Meir (ed.). Guardians of Faith in Modern Times: 'Ulamaʼ' in the Middle East. Brill. pp. 196–197. ISBN 978-90-04-16953-1.
- Wyrtzen, Jonathan (5 January 2016). Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-5017-0425-3.
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- Mezran, Karim (2001). "Negotiating National Identity in North Africa". International Negotiation. 6 (2): 141–173. doi:10.1163/15718060120849026. ISSN 1382-340X.
Further reading
- Ashford, Douglas Elliott (1961). Political Change in Morocco. Princeton University Press (published 8 December 2015). ISBN 978-1-4008-7850-5.
{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
